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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rocco Chacon contends the district court made two errors in this case. First, he asserts
that it erred by denying his motions to sever the charges in this case. In fact, it did not even
conduct the proper analysis required under I.C.R. 14 when evaluating one of those motions. As
such, this Court should vacate his convictions and remand for new, separate trials on the
remaining charges. 1
Second, Mr. Chacon contends the district court improperly admitted evidence of
uncharged drug use and paraphernalia over his objections under I.R.E. 404(b). As such, the
Court should, at least, remand this case for a new trial without that improper evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
When Idaho State Police officers got a tip about Mr. Chacon's whereabouts, they decided
to try to arrest him on outstanding warrants. (E.g., Tr., p.374, Ls.1-6, p.376, Ls.20-22.) Without
using any emergency lights, they partially surrounded his car at a stop sign with unmarked
vehicles. (See, e.g., Tr., p.282, Ls.9-11; State's Exhibit 20.) The officer who stopped in front of
Mr. Chacon admitted he was not wearing any identifying insignia at the time he got out and
pointed his gun at Mr. Chacon. (E.g., Tr., p.274, L.25 - p.275, L.1 (the officer admitting his
insignia was not showing); Tr., p. 777, Ls.14-15 (Mr. Chacon testifying about the officer pointing
his gun).) Although other officers with some identification insignia were approaching from the
side of Mr. Chacon's car, (e.g., Tr., p.408, L.20 - p.409, L.3, p.415, Ls.15-24), Mr. Chacon

1

The jury acquitted Mr. Chacon on two of the five charges alleged in this case, and so, the
protections against double jeopardy would prevent retrial on those two charges.

1

testified he was primarily focused on the man in front ofhim wielding a gun. 2 (Tr., p.779, L.13 p.780, L.2.) He explained he thought he was being robbed. (Tr., p.779, Ls.7-8.) Thinking to get
away from that situation, he turned his car to an opening to his right and drove off, accidentally
hitting the officer in front of him as he did so. 3 (E.g., Tr., p.781, Ls.7-22.) The officers opened
fire as he did so, hitting Mr. Chacon's passenger. (E.g., Tr., p.279, Ls.4-12, p.470, Ls.24-25
(officers explaining where they were shooting); Tr., p.476, L.25 - p.477, L.8 (one of the officers
testifying about the passenger's injuries).)
The officers followed Mr. Chacon in their unmarked vehicles, but were not able to put up
and activate their emergency lights until sometime later. (See, e.g., Tr., p.284, Ls.14-22, p.511,
Ls. I 0-12.) Mr. Chacon admitted that he saw the emergency lights at that point, but was still
shaken by being shot at, so he continued to drive. (Tr., p.788, L.20 - p.789, L.24.) When the
road ended, he continued to run on foot, but officers (one of whom was the one who had been hit
by the car) apprehended Mr. Chacon. (E.g., Tr., p.292, L.14 - p.294, L.17.) That officer said he
found a black case in Mr. Chacon's pocket, which he put in the bed of his truck with other items
taken from Mr. Chacon. (Tr., p.295, L.16 - p.296, L.10.) The items remained in the open there
for an unspecified amount of time. (See Tr., p.295, L.25 - p.297, L.2; Exhibits, p.67 (State's
Exhibit 42).)
The Pocatello Police took over the investigation at that point because of the officerinvolved shooting. (Tr., p.296, L.25 - p.297, L.10.) They searched the black case and found a

2

There was conflicting testimony about whether Mr. Chacon actually saw and recognized that
the men approaching from the side were officers. (See generally Tr.) However, whether or not
he did is irrelevant to the analysis of the issues in this appeal.
3
The jury fully acquitted Mr. Chacon of any criminal conduct in regard to hitting the officer.
(See 383 (acquitting him of all the alleged forms of battery).) The officer was not severely hurt.
(See, e.g., Tr., p. 308, L.20 - p. 311, L.18 (the officer testifying to only having a few scrapes and
bruises).)

2

baggie with a substance ultimately identified as methamphetamine. (Tr., p.665, L.12 - p.666,
L.8, p.674, L.5 - p.675, L.21, p.695, L.18 - p.696, L.10.) They also found a handgun in the
center console. 4 (See Tr., p.723, Ls.15-20.) In addition, they found various items that the officer
described as "marijuana paraphernalia," which included a marijuana bong in the passenger door.

(See generally Tr., p.947, L.21 - p.951, L.24.)
The State initially charged Mr. Chacon with felony eluding (the "eluding charge"), felon
in possession of a firearm (the "firearm charge"), battery with intent on a law enforcement
officer, and grand theft by possession. (R., pp.87-88.) Mr. Chacon moved, inter alia, to sever
those charges under I.C.R. 14. (R., pp.156-57.) At the hearing on that motion, he explained that,
in addition to the risk that the jurors would not be able to separate out the various counts in a
joint trial, there was also a risk the jury would convict him because "he is, essentially, a bad
guy." (Tr., p.49, L.2 - p.50, L.2.) The district court denied that motion, explaining that "I have
to tell them, no you can't think of it like that. Just because you think he might be guilty of this
crime, doesn't necessarily mean that he is going to be guilty of this crime," in regard to an
instruction under I.C.J.I. 110 and 221. 5 (Tr., p.59, L. 1 - p.60, L.24.)
Subsequently, the State filed a new charge for possession of methamphetamine (the
"methamphetamine charge") and moved to join that charge into this case. 6

(R., p.197.)

Mr. Chacon objected to that motion, raising the "same objection as before with regard to the
firearm." (Tr., p.74, Ls.21-22.) He also argued that, in joining that charge, the jury would "be

4

The handgun had been stolen, but the jury acquitted Mr. Chacon of any criminal conduct in that
regard. (See R., p.382 (acquitting him of grand theft by possession).)
5
The district court ultimately did not give an instruction consistent with I.C.J.I. 110 or 221. (See
generally R., pp.384-440.) However, neither party requested such instructions, either prior to
trial or during the jury instruction conference. (See generally R., pp.244-54, 317-48; Tr., p.962,
L.11 - p.974, L.24.)
6
At trial, the prosecutor conceded that Mr. Chacon was not charged with possessing any drugs or
paraphernalia except the methamphetamine allegedly found on his person. (Tr., p.640, Ls.9-10.)

3

getting evidence which is prejudicial to my client that should not be admitted, and wouldn't have
otherwise been admitted, if we're only talking about the battery with intent case or the eluding
case." (Tr., p.75, Ls.8-19.) The district court granted the State's motion to join that charge
because "I think that the jury can sort through each and every charge and has the ability to do
so." (Tr., p.77, L.15 - p.78, L.4.)
During the State's case-in-chief, the prosecutor sought to introduce pictures of the
marijuana bong from the passenger door. (See generally Tr., p.636, L.23 - p.645, L.6; Exhibits,
pp.68-69 (State's Exhibits 29-30).) Mr. Chacon objected on both the relevance and prejudice
prongs of the I.R.E. 404(b) analysis. (Tr., p.639, Ls.6-10; see generally Exhibits 29-30.) The
prosecutor argued the paraphernalia was relevant to Mr. Chacon's knowledge and use of the
drugs on his person, describing it as a methamphetamine pipe. 7 (Tr., p.640, Ls.11-13.) The
district court overruled Mr. Chacon's objections and admitted the pictures. (Tr., p.644, L.24 p.645, L.3.)
Subsequently, during the defense case-in-chief, Mr. Chacon offered explanations for his
connection with drug culture in order to explain why he thought he was being robbed.
(Tr., p.823, L.9 - p.826, L.18.) During cross-examination, and over objection, the prosecutor
elicited testimony from Mr. Chacon that he used heroin earlier on the day in question.
(Tr., p.845, Ls.9-20 (defense counsel specifically objecting to relevance and beyond the scope of
direct examination).)
7

The State's notices of intent did not give any indication that it would be seeking to present any
evidence related to other drug use or paraphernalia under I.R.E. 404(b). (R., pp.219-20, 281-83
(only identifying evidence of Mr. Chacon's prior warrants, a prior incident involving the officer
who was hit by the car, and two prior incidents of Mr. Chacon running from officers as subject to
admission under I.R.E. 404(b)).) However, defense counsel did not object to the introduction of
his prior drug use or the drug paraphernalia on the basis that it was not included in those notices.
(See generally Tr., R.) Mr. Chacon reserves the right to pursue remedies in that regard through
post-conviction, should he deem it necessary and appropriate.

4

Then, during the State's rebuttal case, the prosecutor sought to elicit testimony from the
officer who searched Mr. Chacon's car about the paraphernalia found in the car, and how it was
related to the drug culture. (See Tr., p.941, Ls.1-23.) Defense counsel objected to that evidence
based on relevance and improper rebuttal testimony, and that it would be improperly prejudicial
propensity evidence. (Tr., p.940, Ls.15-22, p.942, Ls.1-20.) The district court overruled that
objection. (Tr., p.944, Ls.4-21.)
The officer subsequently testified that he had opened a safe in the car and that it
contained "mostly marijuana paraphernalia, small amounts of marijuana." 8 (Tr., p.947, Ls.2123.) The prosecutor followed up on that, asking "When you say . . . marijuana paraphernalia,
what is it that you're referring to?" and the officer answered, "Pipes, packaging material."
(Tr., p.948, Ls.5-8.) Again, the prosecutor sought clarification: "So when you say 'pipes' what
is a marijuana pipe?" (Tr., p.949, Ls.4-5.) The officer explained "there's several different kinds.
You have bongs that contain water to clean off the smoke you're inhaling, and then you have
small pipes. They're used to smoke it, made from a variety of materials." (Tr., p.949, Ls.6-10.)
After asking about potential items of paraphernalia "found in the rear of the vehicle," the
prosecutor asked, "How about the front passenger side?" (Tr., p.951, Ls.10-22.) The officer
answered, "There was a bong in the door, passenger door." (Tr., p.951, Ls.21-24.) At no point

8

Defense counsel objected several times to foundation during this line of questioning, and those
objections were sustained, with the district court directing the prosecutor to lay foundation for
those questions. (See, e.g., Tr., p.947, L.24 - p.948, L.14.) There were no accompanying
motions to strike, and defense counsel did not renew the foundation objections after the
prosecutor elicited testimony about the officer's training and experience with drugs and drug
culture. (See generally Tr.)

5

during that discussion was methamphetamine use mentioned. 9 (See generally Tr., p.94 7, L.21 p.951, L.24.)
Defense counsel addressed each of the charges in tum during closing arguments. With
respect to the methamphetamine charge, he simply said that, unless the jurors had a doubt about
"the chain of things," there was not really anything else for him to say on the methamphetamine
charge. (Tr., p.1025, Ls.11-13; see also Tr., p.660, Ls.1-5, p.667, L.5 - p.668, L.4 (defense
counsel making continuing objections about the lack of evidence showing chain of custody of the
black case, which were overruled).) As to the firearm charge, defense counsel argued there was
reasonable doubt about whether Mr. Chacon knew it was in the car, since the evidence
introduced by the State all showed it was covered up by a black bag and it was not positioned in
a way for the driver to grab and use the gun. (Tr., p.1028, L.8 - p.1029, L.18; see Tr., p.723,
Ls.15-20 (noting the gun was positioned under the emergency brake with the barrel pointing
toward the driver); Tr., p.729, Ls.13-22 (recalling the black bag covering the gun); Exhibits, p.72
(State's Exhibit 34 showing the gun in the car).) Finally, as to the eluding charge, defense
counsel argued there was reasonable doubt specifically in regard to the elements that would
justify a conviction for felony eluding as opposed to misdemeanor eluding after the point the
officers actually activated their emergency lights. (Tr., p.1025, L.16 -p.1027, L.23.)
The jury ultimately found Mr. Chacon guilty on the eluding charge, the firearm charge,
and the methamphetamine charge. (R., pp.382-83.) The district court subsequently sentenced

9

The only other drugs which the officer mentioned during his testimony about the paraphernalia
were "pills and heroin," which he testified could be smoked by heating them on a piece of
aluminum foil and the resulting smoke breathed in through a small pipe or tube. (Tr., p.953,
Ls.5-9.)

6

him to an aggregate term of seven years, with four years fixed on this case. 10 (Tr., p.1088, Ls.125.) Mr. Chacon filed a notice of appeal timely from the resulting judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.463, 471.)

10

Specifically, it imposed a sentence of five years, with three years fixed on the eluding charge,
a five-year sentence, with four years fixed, on the firearm charge, and a seven-year sentence,
with four years fixed, on the methamphetamine charge. (Tr., p.1088, Ls.1-25.) It ordered those
sentences to run concurrent to each other, but consecutive to a case in which Mr. Chacon had
been on probation at the time of these offenses. (See Tr., p.1089, Ls.6-11.)

7

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Chacon's motion to sever the charges in
this case.

II.

Whether the district court erred by admitting evidence of Mr. Chacon's prior drug use
and possession of paraphernalia in violation ofl.R.E. 404(b).

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Chacon's Motions To Sever The Charges In This Case

A.

Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 14 allows a court to sever charges even if joinder would be proper as

a matter of law if presenting those charges in a single trial would be prejudicial to the defendant.

State v. Williams, 163 Idaho 285, 293 (Ct. App. 2018). There are three potential sources of
prejudice that the court needs to consider in that regard:
(1) the jury may confuse and cumulate the evidence, and convict the defendant of
one or both crimes when it would not convict him of either if it could keep
evidence properly segregated; (2) the defendant may be confounded in presenting
defenses, as where he desires to assert his privilege against self-incrimination with
respect to one crime but not to the other; or (3) the jury may conclude that the
defendant is guilty of one crime and then find him guilty of the other because of
his criminal disposition.

Id. (quoting State v. Abel, 104 Idaho 865, 867-68 (1983)); see also State v. Orellana-Castro, 158
Idaho 757, 760 (2015) (noting that the most common form of prejudice is the third kind, which is
essentially an argument that the evidence of one offense would not be admissible in separate
trials under I.R.E. 404(b )).
Whether charges should be severed under I.C.R. 14 is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 760; State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 564-65 (2007).
The district court abuses its discretion when:

(1) it fails to recognize the issue as one of

discretion; (2) it acts beyond the outer bounds of its discretion; (3) it acts inconsistently with the
applicable legal standards, or (4) it reaches its decision without exercising reason. Lunneborg v.

My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018).

9

B.

The District Court Failed To Consider The Type Of Prejudice Mr. Chacon Alleged In His
Objection To Joining The Methamphetamine Charge To The Other Charges
Mr. Chacon's argument with regard to not joining the methamphetamine charge to the

eluding or firearm charges was focused specifically on the third type of prejudice under I.C.R. 14
- that it would allow improper propensity evidence to infect the analysis on each charge.
(Tr., p.75, Ls.8-19.) However, the district court did not discuss that potential source of prejudice
in ruling on Mr. Chacon's motion. (See generally Tr.) Rather, it ruled that there would be no
prejudice under the first type of prejudice - whether the evidence on the various charges would
confuse the jurors, or whether they would be able to keep the charges separate: "As far as
prejudice is concerned, I don't know that the jury - that the defendant would be prejudiced just
because there were multiple charges against him. I think that the jury can sort through each and
every charge and has the ability to do so, and so I'm going to go ahead and grant the motion to
join [the methamphetamine charge]." (Tr., p.77, L.20 - p.78, L.4.)
The district court abuses its discretion when it does not conduct all the analysis required
of it because, in that case, it is not acting consistent with the applicable legal standards.
Compare Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762 ("In this case, the district court did not conduct the
analysis" required under I.R.E. 404(b ), and as a result, "it did not act consistent with the
applicable legal standards and therefore abused its discretion in denying the motion to sever").
The three different categories of prejudice under I.C.R. 14 require distinct analysis from the
others. See Abel, 104 Idaho at 867-68; Williams, 163 Idaho at 293. Otherwise, there would be
no reason to identify three different types of prejudice in the first place. Thus, while the evidence
may not be of the kind that risks juror confusion as to which charge is being discussed, it could
still be the kind that risks propensity analyses affecting the jury's deliberations.

As such,

analysis as to one type of prejudice will not address the other types of prejudice. Therefore, as in

10

Orellana-Castro, the district court abused its discretion in Mr. Chacon's case by not conducting
the required analysis regarding whether the third type of prejudice should have resulted in
severance of the methamphetamine charge in this case.

C.

Under The Applicable Standard, The District Court Erred By Not Severing The Charges
Because The Evidence Of Each Remaining Charge Would Not Have Been Admissible In
Separate Trials
The district court's decision to deny Mr. Chacon's motion to sever the initial four

charges, as well as its decision to join the methamphetamine charge over Mr. Chacon's
objection, are not consistent with the applicable legal precedent because the evidence of each
charge would not be admissible in separate trials under I.R.E. 404(b). See Orellana-Castro, 158
Idaho at 760. Appellate review of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) is subject to a multi-tiered
review. State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138 (Ct. App. 2011). First, there must be sufficient
evidence to show that the act in question, in fact, occurred. Id. Second, that evidence must be
relevant to a non-propensity purpose, an evaluation which the appellate courts freely review, as it
is a question of law. Id. Third, the risk of undue prejudice cannot substantially outweigh the
probative value of that evidence, an evaluation which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
at 139.
In this case, the prejudice specifically arises in regard to the third tier of that inquiry any potential relevance evidence of the other charges might have had was substantially
outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. For example, as defense counsel pointed out, the
only relevance the methamphetamine and firearm charges had to the eluding charge was "just
matter of making him look bad by charging him with guns and drug charges and having the jury
hear all of that." (Tr., p.75, Ls.13-16; see also R., pp.156-57 (Mr. Chacon moving to sever the
firearms charge from the eluding charge for similar reasons).) In other words, the jurors could

11

have disregarded their reasonable doubts about whether Mr. Chacon had committed felony
eluding (as opposed to misdemeanor eluding) based on his criminal propensity demonstrated by
his possession of drugs and guns. (See Tr., p.1025, L.16 - p.1027, L.23.)
Likewise, there was a risk of undue prejudice with regard to not severing the firearm
charge from the methamphetamine charge. In fact, particular care needs to be taken with these
two particular types of charges, as the Court of Appeals had acknowledged there is a "recognized
propensity of persons engaged in selling narcotics to carry firearms." See, e.g., State v. Pierce,
137 Idaho 296, 299-300 (Ct. App. 2002). As such, the jurors could have disregarded their
reasonable doubts about whether Mr. Chacon possessed the methamphetamine because of "the
chain of things" or his knowledge of the gun under the black bag based on his criminal
propensity. (See Tr., p.1025, Ls.11-13, p.1028, L.8 - p.1029, L.18.)
Additionally, the evidence of each charge had little probative value beyond propensity to
prove guilt on the other charges.

For example, evidence of unlawful possession of

methamphetamine or a firearm says little about whether the car was being driven in a reckless
manner while being signaled to stop, so as to help prove felony eluding.
Since there was an undue risk that the jury would convict Mr. Chacon based on
propensity considerations, and since that undue risk would have substantially outweighed the
potential probative value of the evidence of the other charged conduct, the evidence of the other
charges would not have been admissible in separate trials.

As such, the joinder was still

prejudicial regardless of the jury's ability to keep the evidence relating to the three charges
separate. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Chacon's motions to
sever those charges.

12

II.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence Of Mr. Chacon's Prior Drug Use And
Possession Of Paraphernalia In Violation Ofl.R.E. 404(b)

A.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of evidence under I.R.E. 404(b) is subject to a multi-tiered review.

State v. Naranjo, 152 Idaho 134, 138 (Ct. App. 2011). First, there must be sufficient evidence to
show that the act in question, in fact, occurred. Id. Second, that evidence must be relevant to a
non-propensity purpose, an evaluation which the appellate courts freely review, as it is a question
oflaw. Id. Third, the risk of undue prejudice cannot substantially outweigh the probative value
of that evidence, an evaluation which is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 139; see

Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863-64.

B.

The Evidence Of Prior Drug Use And Paraphernalia Possession Was Not Relevant To
This Case Except Through An Improper Propensity Analysis

1. The marijuana bong in the passenger door
The testimony offered in regard to the item found in the passenger door was that it was a
marijuana bong, not a methamphetamine pipe. Specifically, the officer who searched the car
testified that the item in the passenger door was a "bong." (Tr., p.951, Ls.21-24.) The only other
time he used the term "bong" was to describe what he meant by "marijuana paraphernalia." (See
Tr., p.947, L.21 - p.951, 22.)

In fact, the pictures of that item show that it had a marijuana-leaf

design on it. (See State's Exhibits 29-30.)
As such, the marijuana bong was not relevant to prove Mr. Chacon's knowing possession
of the methamphetamine except through an improper propensity analysis that Mr. Chacon was a
drug user. Therefore, the district court erred by admitting evidence regarding the marijuana bong

13

(both the pictures of it in the State's case-in-chief and the officer's testimony about it in the
State's rebuttal case) under the relevance tier of the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b).

2. The heroin use earlier that day
For the same reason the marijuana bong was not relevant, the fact that Mr. Chacon used
heroin earlier in the day has no relevance to prove his knowing possession of the
methamphetamine except through improper propensity rationales. In fact, the district court had

already acknowledged the tenuous link in that regard, as it had sustained a relevance objection to
testimony that one of the officers knew Mr. Chacon' s passenger because she was known to buy
heroin. (Tr., p.478, Ls.12-20.) The same rationale should have applied to the evidence that
Mr. Chacon used heroin earlier in the day. Therefore, the district court erred by allowing the
State to elicit that evidence under the relevance tier of the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) as well.

C.

The Risk Of Undue Prejudice From The Marijuana Bong Substantially Outweighed The
Potential Probative Value
As discussed in Section I(B), supra, Mr. Chacon's only argument on the

methamphetamine charge was that, due to gaps in the chain of custody, there was reasonable
doubt as to his possession and knowledge of the methamphetamine. 11 (See Tr., p.1025, Ls.11-13
(acknowledging, if the jurors did not have doubts about that, there was not much else for defense
counsel to say).) Whatever probative value the marijuana bong might have had in that regard
was substantially outweighed by the risk that the jurors would disregard their doubts about
whether Mr. Chacon knowingly possessed the methamphetamine and convict him based on his

11

Mr. Chacon did not make an argument that the evidence of his prior heroin use was unduly
prejudicial. (See generally Tr.)

14

character as a drug user. Therefore, the district court also abused its discretion by admitting that
evidence on the third tier of the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Chacon respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and either remand
this case for separate trials on the remaining charges, or, alternatively, for a new trial without the
inclusion of improper propensity evidence.
DATED this 25 th day of February, 2020.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
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Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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